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COMMENT




RICHARD D. MARSICO, JR.*
In Doe v. Selective Service System,' a federal district court
judge enjoined the Selective Service Board from enforcing the
Solomon Amendment, 2 the law that prohibits students who have
not certified that they have registered for the draft from receiv-
ing federal financial aid for higher education.3 The plaintiffs
contended that the Solomon Amendment constituted an uncon-
stitutional bill of attainder4 and violated the students' Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
5
Government attorneys filed an appeal, 6 and, on further review,
the Supreme Court stayed the prelimininary injunction pending
appeal to and final resolution of the case by the Court.7
This Comment evaluates the bill of attainder attack on the
Solomon Amendment. It begins by considering the history of
the law and then summarizes the district court's opinion in Doe.
Next, it considers the modes of analysis that courts have em-
* B.A., Fordham University, 1982; member, Class of 1985, Harvard Law School.
'557 F. Supp. 937 (D. Minn. 1983), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3932 (June 28, 1983)
(No. 83-276). The district court found that the plaintiffs had a probability of success on
the merits. Id. at 950.
2 Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 (formally entitled Enforcement
of the Military Selective Service Act), Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1113, 96 Stat. 718, 748
(1982) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 453) [hereinafter referred to as the Solomon
Amendment or the Amendment].
The Solomon Amendment amended the Military Selective Service Act of 1948, 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1976). The Act created the system by which men register and
are drafted. Although the draft ended in 1973, registration requirements continued until
March 29, 1975. Proclamation No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975). President Carter
reinstated mandatory registration on July 2, 1980. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg.
45,247 (1980).
4 A bill of attainder is a legislative adjudication of guilt that exacts punishment on a
specific person or group without the protections of a judicial trial. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4, at 484 (1978). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (prohibiting
Congress from passing a bill of attainder); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (placing similar
restrictions on the states). See also infra text accompanying notes 49-56.
- U.S. CONST. amend. V (no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself").
6 At the time this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court had not yet scheduled
arguments.
7 51 U.S.L.W. 3932 (June 28, 1983) (No. A-1033).
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ployed in deciding if a particular piece of legislation is a bill of
attainder. Finally, this doctrine is appplied to examine the valid-
ity of the Solomon Amendment.
I. HISTORY OF THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT
Representative Gerald B.H. Solomon (R-N.Y.) introduced the
Amendment on July 28, 1982, during the House debate on De-
fense Department spending for 1983.8 Senators Mack Mattingly
(R-Ga.) and S.I. Hayakawa (R-Cal.) had introduced similar leg-
islation in the Senate on May 12, 1982. 9 In its final form, the
Solomon Amendment states that any person who is required to
register for the draft and does not "shall be ineligible for any
form of assistance or benefit provided under Title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965."0
The Department of Education (DOE) issued its final regula-
tions implementing the Amendment on April 11, 1983."1 Under
these regulations a student seeking financial aid is required to
submit a statement of compliance with the registration law to
the Secretary of Education. Any student who does not file such
a statement cannot qualify for financial aid under the Higher
Education Act.' 2 Using the Department's model statement of
registration compliance or a similar form,' 3 a student must cer-
tify either that he has complied with the Selective Service Act
or is exempted from registration for one of the reasons stated
therein. ' 4 Starting in the 1985-1986 school year, students eligible
for the first time for Title IV aid will be required to prove that
they have complied with the Selective Service Act by submitting
the appropriate documents. ' 5 The regulations also require notice
to be sent to students whose aid is about to be denied for failure
to file the compliance statement. A student who receives such
8 128 CONG. REC. H4756 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
9 Id. at S4943 (daily ed. May 12, 1982).
10 Id.; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1089 (1976).
1 Dcp't of Educ.. Student Assistance General Provisions, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,578 (1983)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.24).
12-Id. The protected aid programs include Pell Grants, Supplemental Educational
Opportunity Grants, College Work Study, National Direct Student Loans, Guaranteed
Student Loans, PLUS loans, and Student Incentive Grant Programs. Id.
'3 See 48 Fed. Reg. 15,582 (1983) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.25).
11 Exempted classes include women, persons in the armed services on active duty,
persons not yet eighteen years old, and residents of the Trust Territories of the Pacific
Islands. Id. The form does not contain an exemption for conscientious objectors. Id.
-148 Fed. Reg. 15,582 (1983) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.26).
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notice will be given thirty additional days to file. A student who
is denied benefits can request a hearing.
6
The Solomon Amendment and the DOE regulations sparked
a national debate. Representative Solomon hailed the regula-
tions, stating: "If young men want the privilege of getting low-
cost, taxpayer funded college loans, then they damn well ought
to live up to their duty to obey the law.' 1 7 The legislation also
met with strong opposition. Financial aid administrators at col-
leges around the country resented the law for the administrative
burden and governmental intrusion it imposed on them, if not
for political reasons.' 8 The Brethren, Mennonite, and Quaker
Churches established funds to support students whose federal
loan applications were denied as a result of nonregistration. 19
II. Doe v. Selective Service
Plaintiffs in Doe are college students who were required to
register under Section 453 of the Selective Service Act and who
were unable to file truthful compliance statements. They claimed
that they would be unable to remain in college without federal
education aid. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, challenging that law
as an unconstitutional bill of attainder and alleging violations of
their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
16 Id. at 13,583 (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 668.27).
17 129 CONG. REC. E315 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1983) (extension of remarks of Rep.
Solomon). Similar legislation has already been sucessfully introduced. On October 13,
1982, President Reagan signed into law the Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. No.
97-300, 96 Stat. 1399 (1982) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1504). Under its terms, the
Secretary of Labor is required to ensure that all people participating in any of the
programs funded by the Act have registered for the draft.
18 N.Y. Times, July 19, 1983, at Cl, col. 1. In August, 1983, the newsletter of the
Committee Against Registration for the Draft, Rough Draft, compiled a list of responses
by various northeast colleges to the Amendment. According to their researchers, Boston
College, Boston University, Brandeis University, Emmanuel College, and Northeastern
University all planned to send compliance forms to students. Dartmouth College, Har-
vard University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology planned to send out the
compliance forms and also to help their students obtain market rate, nonfederally
financed loans. Yale University and Brown University planned to help affected students
find campus jobs and commercial loans. Williams College did not intend to send com-
pliance forms to its students and was attempting to secure employment and alumni/
parent sponsored loans for students. Wellesley College planned not to send compliance
forms to its students and hoped to be exempted from the regulations. Middlebury College
did not mail forms to its students and has attempted to replace work-study funds lost
by students by giving them jobs on the college payroll. Rough Draft, Aug., 1983, at 3-
4.
19 N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at B16, col. 1.
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A. Irreparable Harm
Rejecting the Selective Service's claim that plaintiffs were not
threatened with harm because they had not yet aplied for or
been denied federal aid, Judge Alsop asserted a presumption
that the Secretary of Education would comply with the regula-
tions and that plaintiffs' aid would be denied. The court held
that the inevitable denial of aid to the plaintiffs demonstrated a
threat of irreparable harm because the plaintiffs would be unable
to remain in college. 20 Judge Alsop stressed the great value that
the Supreme Court has attached to a college education.2 '
The court also held that the Solomon Amendment threatened
plaintiffs with irreparable harm to their Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination.2 2 Those who invoke the Fifth
Amendment instead of filing a compliance form would lose fi-
nancial aid benefits and could be providing the government with
incriminating evidence.
B. Balancing Injuries
The court next weighed the threat of harm to the plaintiffs
against the harm an injunction would impose on the Selective
Service System. Judge Alsop found that the potential harm to
the plaintiffs if an injunction were not granted, namely the loss
of the opportunity to go to college, far outweighed the potential
disruption in the administration of the draft registration system
that the issuance of the injunction might cause. 23
C. Probability of Success on the Merits
1. Bill of Attainder. The Constitution prohibits Congress
from passing a bill of attainder.24 Judge Alsop defined a bill of
attainder as "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual or group without the
protections of a judicial trial. ' 25 He applied a three-part test to
,0 Doe v. Selective Service, 557 F. Supp. 937, 939-40.
21 Id. at 939, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, reh. denied, 103 S. Ct. 14 (1982), in
which the Court described education as providing opportunities for individuals and
assuring a high quality of community life. Id. at 221.
-2 557 F. Supp. at 940.
.1 Id. at 941
2. See supra note 4.
- 557 F. Supp. at 941.
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determine whether the Amendment was a bill of attainder. The
court considered whether the Solomon Amendment is aimed at
a specific person or group based on its past conduct, whether it
is a legislative determination of guilt, and whether it imposes a
punishment.
a. Application to a specific person or group. Plaintiffs argued
that the Amendment is aimed at a specific group of persons -
young male students who require federal financial aid for edu-
cation but who cannot file truthful statements of registration
compliance. 26 In contrast, defendants claimed that the Amend-
ment does not attach to a specific group because it does not
punish persons for the past act of nonregistration. Rather, it
attempts to regulate the present and future conduct of men who
are required to register and desire federal education aid. 7 In
rejecting defendants' argument, Judge Alsop relied on Cum-
mings v. Missouri,28 in which the Supreme Court rejected a
similar argument applied to a statute requiring loyalty oaths as
a condition of practicing certain professions.29 Judge Alsop said
that because males born after January 1, 1963, who failed to
register within thirty days of their birthday cannot do so without
being subject to prosecution for late registration, the statute
does not encourage them to comply, but punishes them as mem-
bers of a clearly ascertainable group whose members are iden-
tified by past conduct which they cannot eradicate.30
b. Legislative determination of guilt. Judge Alsop ruled that
because the Solomon Amendment automatically denies federal
aid to students who fail to file a compliance form, it "assumes
that all students who fail to submit the required statement pos-
sess a guilty intent to avoid registration requirements."' 3' The
students who fail to file a compliance form are denied financial
aid whether the nonregistration is intentional or innocent.32 The
Amendment assumes that all students who fail to submit the
required statement possess a guilty intent to avoid the registra-
26 Id. at 942.
21 Id. A statute which applies to persons because of their past conduct is considered
to be aimed at that specific group because those persons whose past behavior brings
them under the statute cannot eradicate their past acts and escape the deprivations of
the statute. Id.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
9 557 F. Supp. at 942.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 943.
32 Under the Selective Service Act, penal sanctions can be imposed only on persons
who knowingly fail to obey their registration obligations. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1981).
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tion requirements, and is therefore a legislative adjudication of
guilt. 33
c. Imposition of punishment. The third element of the court's
bill of attainder test was whether the statute imposed punish-
ment. In determining this, the court followed Nixon v. General
Services Administration,34 in which the Supreme Court upheld
against a bill of attainder challenge a statute which deprived
former President Nixon of the right to dispose of his Presidential
papers and tapes as he wished. The Court listed three areas that
courts should examine in determining whether a statute which
imposes a burden is actually imposing a punishment: whether
the deprivation falls into an historical category of punishment,
whether the burden was incidental to a valid governmental reg-
ulation, and whether the statute was passed with a punitive
motive.
35
Following Nixon, the district court first considered whether
the denial of educational benefits falls into the category of his-
torical punishments. 36 Defendant argued that this was not a
punishment as that term has been interpreted by the courts. The
defendants claimed that the Solomon Amendment was compar-
able to the statute in Flemming v. Nestor37 that denied Social
Security benefits to persons who had been deported because of
past subversive activity. Judge Alsop disagreed, 38 stating that
the sanctions provided by the Solomon Amendment fall into the
class of punishment through which the legislature bars groups
or individuals from employment or vocations. The Supreme
Court has found these punishments to be unconstitutional.3 9
As required by the Nixon decision, the court next considered
whether the statute and the deprivation it imposes furthers le-
gitimate nonpunitive legislative purposes. Judge Alsop found
that the statute failed this functional test. According to the court,
the statute "imposes both a restraint and disability, assumes
nonregistrants possess a guilty intent, promotes the aims of
retribution and deterrence, applies to behavior that is already a
crime and is excessively broad in relation to its alternative
purposes.''40 In rejecting the Selective Service's argument that
1 557 F. Supp. at 943.
34 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
11 Id. at 473-78.
36 557 F. Supp. at 944.
37 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
38 557 F. Supp. at 943-44.
39 Id. at 943.
40 Id. at 944.
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the legitimate nonpunitive purposes of the statute were to en-
courage registration, to promote a just allocation of financial
aid, and to assist the Selective Service in enforcing draft regis-
tration laws, 41 the court noted that "every 'punishment' could
be renamed an 'encouragement' thereby escaping the Consti-
tution's prescription on bills of attainder. 42
Finally, the court considered whether the legislative record
evinces a congressional intent to punish recalcitrant students.
The court reviewed the legislative history and found such an
intent. While Judge Alsop agreed with the defendants that the
Congressional Record included statements that the Solomon
Amendment's purpose was to encourage compliance, he found
that "thorough examination of those statements ... clearly re-
veal [sic] a punitive intent. 43
Thus, plaintiffs met all of the requisite tests to establish a bill
of attainder. The court concluded that plaintiffs had shown a
probability of success on the merits of their claim that the
Solomon Amendment was an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
2. The Fifth Amendment. The court also found that plaintiffs
had established a likelihood of success on their claim that the
Solomon Amendment violated the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination." It held that the infor-
mation required is incriminating to nonregistrants and could also
furnish a link in the chain of evidence used to prosecute them. 45
Moreover, the statute penalizes those students who exercise the
privilege by denying them access to federal financial aid for
college.4
6
D. The Public Interest
Judge Alsop concluded that because plaintiffs had demon-
strated a likelihood of success on their claim that the Amend-
ment is unconstitutional, the public interest favored an injunc-
tion. The court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction
and ended its decision with a disclaimer: this decision should
not be "construed as condoning noncompliance with the valid
draft registration laws of this nation .... The issue here before
41 Id.
42 Id. at 944-45.
43 Id. at 945.
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this court turns not on whether the registration law should be
enforced, but in what manner. '47
Justice Department officials appealed the injunction to Justice
Blackmun, Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit. He stayed the
injunction, and the rest of the Supreme Court affirmed his
decision.
48
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAIM
A. Overview
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which adjudicates guilt
and imposes punishment on a person or an easily ascertainable
group without the protections guaranteed in criminal trials.4 9
Bills of attainder were valid exercises of legislative power in
England and most of the colonies during the pre-Constitutional
period, 50 but were banned by the United States Constitution.51
11 Id. at 950.
4 151 U.S.L.W. 3938. According to the New York Tines, government lawyers con-
vinced the Court that concern for national security and the wide deference given to
Congress when it legislates for reasons of national security required a stay of the
injunction. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1983, at Cl, col. 1. To have accepted this argument,
the Court must have begun with the presumption that the Solomon Amendment was an
attempt to enforce the Selective Service Act. The Court's traditional deference to
Congress when it legislates about issues of national security was reaffirmed in Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). The Court in Rostker accepted a gender-based clas-
sification which excluded women from military registration requirements instead of
subjecting the classification to stricter scrutiny. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority
that "[t]he case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national defense and
military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater
deference." 453 U.S. at 64-65 The Court also doubted its own competence to adjudicate
questions of national security: "Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power
in this area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked." Id.
at 65. For other cases in which the Court has accepted other suspect classifications as
legitimate incidents of regulating national security, see Korematsu v. U.S., 319 U.S.
432 (1942) (racially based discrimination); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1967)
(speech); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1973) (overbreadth doctrine).
19 See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
50 Bills of attainder most often appeared in England and the United States during
periods of political unrest and distrust. Garner v. Board of Public Workers, 341 U.S. at
745. They played an integral role in British succession struggles and religious persecu-
tions and were passed by colonial legislatures during the Revolutionary War. For ex-
amples of statutes which persecuted Loyalists, see Reppe, The Spectre of Attainder in
New York, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. Rev. 1 (1948). For examples of British bills of attainder,
see U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445-46, n.19 (1965); Communist Party v. Subsersive
Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 149-54 (1960) (appendix to Black, J., concurring);
Barenblatt v. U.S. , 360 U.S. 109, 160-62 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 146-50 (1951) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Lehmann, The Bill of Attaitder Doctrine: A Survey of Decisional Law, 5
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767 (1978); and Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification:
A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962).
51 See supra note 4.
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Despite the constitutional prohibition, Congress and the states
passed laws which later were found to be bills of attainder during
the post-Civil War period52 and the Communist scare of the
1940's and 1950's.
5 3
The Supreme Court, in analyzing challenged legislation, re-
quires four elements to find that a statute is a bill of attainder:
a legislative act, an imposition of punishment, application of the
punishment to a specific person or group, and absence of judicial
safeguards.5 4 Any statute deemed by the Court to contain these
four elements will be struck down.
The Court's most recent formulation of the bill of attainder
test came in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.5
Speaking of the relationship between punishment and the spec-
ification of an individual, Justice Brennan stated that the bill of
attainder prohibition is applicable only to cases in which the
individual or group is punished by a statute. He specified that
such a statutory punishment exists if: a) the statute inflicts a
traditional form of punishment such as death or imprisonment;
b) it imposes a deprivation of a government benefit without
serving a legitimate governmental purpose; or c) Congress
passed the statute with punitive motives.5 6
As reflected in Nixon, the Court's bill of attainder analysis
focuses on whether the act in question inflicts punishment. The
Court, however, approaches this question from two different
perspectives. The Court first undertakes a quasi-equal protec-
tion analysis which examines whether the deprivation caused
by the statute is actually an incident of rational regulation of a
legitimate governmental concern. If it is, the deprivation is not
52 See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Ex Parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (opinion of Burton, J.); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Many statutes drafted during this period, however, survived
challenges brought on bill of attainder grounds. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subver-
sive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1960); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960);
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
- Lehmann, The Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Survey of Decisional Law, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 767 (1978). The punishment can be the deprivation of any right or privilege
and is not limited to traditional forms of punishment which accompanied attainders.
See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 475 (1977); Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 320 (1866). In addition, the legislation does not have to
specify the person or group by name. If it applies to past acts committed by a certain
group which Congress has deemed worthy of punishment, a court will find that the act
applies to that group. See, e.g., Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866).
55 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
56 Id. at 470-78.
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found to be a punishment. 57 The second approach assumes that
the purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is to implement the
notion of the separation of powers, specifically legislative and
judicial powers. If the Court finds that, in enacting a statutory
deprivation, the legislature was acting as a court - deeming
certain persons guilty of punishable behavior and exacting a
punishment - the statute will be found to be a bill of attainder.5 8
Both analyses involve the question of whether Congress, in
enacting a deprivation, intended to punish a particular class.
There is, however, a crucial difference in the analyses. The
quasi-equal protection/regulatory analysis is sympathetic to the
existence of a valid governmental regulatory motive. If there is
such a valid motive and the statute regulates the activity in
question by passing standards of behavior related to the activity,
the statute is acceptable.
Even if a statute is regulatory on its face, however, it is is a
bill of attainder if it imposes a deprivation on a group of people
as a result of past conduct which they cannot undo by changing
present behavior.5 9 The second analysis is concerned with
whether the legislature, in imposing a burden on a class of
persons, has done so because it deems them guilty of certain
behavior. It is this legislative adjudication of guilt which violates
the Bill of Attainder Clause. 60 Unlike the first, this form of
analysis is not concerned with a valid regulatory motive or with
whether the deprivation is a legitimate regulatory burden as
opposed to punishment.
B. Regulatoiy Analysis
The roots of the regulatory analysis applied in bill of attainder
cases can be traced to Cummings v. Missouri.6' In that case,
the Supreme Court rejected Missouri's argument that a provi-
sion of the state's antebellum constitution requiring priests and
%7 See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); American Com-
munications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1949).
"I See, e.g.. U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
19 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1960);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S.
716 (1951); American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
60 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). See also Note, The
Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder
Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 356 (1965).
61 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
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clergymen to take a loyalty oath that they had been loyal to the
South during the Civil War was a valid regulation of the clergy.
The Court found that because there was no relation between
previous disloyalty and the ability to be a priest, the statute was
not a regulation of the clergy, but a punishment for past con-
duct.62 The Court held that a statute which disqualifies persons
from certain professions on the basis of past conduct will be
upheld against a bill of attainder challenge only if there is some
relation between the past conduct and the ability to practice the
profession. 63
Regulatory analysis has been refined to allow a statute which
regulates a profession or activity by disqualifying persons from
that activity based on their past conduct if those persons may
renounce their past conduct by changing their present behavior.
In American Communications Association v. Douds,64 plaintiffs
challenged as a bill of attainder a law that denied labor unions
access to the National Labor Relations Board if officials of those
unions failed to file affidavits affirming that they were not Com-
munists. The Court held that this was a legitimate nonpunitive
exercise of congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce65 because the law did not punish union leaders based
on past membership in the Communist Party. The law allowed
them to avoid sanctions by renouncing their membership and
conforming their behavior to acceptable standards. 66 Thus, when
a regulation is based not on past, ineradicable acts, but on
"continuing contemporaneous" 67 behavior, it is not punitive, and
not a bill of attainder. Legislation which imposes sanctions on
individuals only if they fail to change their present behavior
does not fall under the bill of attainder prohibition.
C. Separation of Powers Analysis
The Supreme Court most completely formulated the separa-
tion of powers analysis in bill of attainder cases in United States
62 Id.
6 Thus, in Hawker v. State of New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1897), the Court upheld a
state statute which made it illegal for persons previously convicted of a felony to practice
medicine, agreeing with the state's argument that protecting its citizens from physicians
of bad moral character is a legitimate interest of the state. Id. at 196.
339 U.S. 382 (1950).
6s 339 U.S. at 387-88. The Court also considered First Amendment issues.
6 Id. at 413-14.
67 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 86-87 (1960)
(registration requirement imposed on the Communist Party is not a bill of attainder).
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v. Brown. 68 In Brown, the Court struck down Section 504 of the
Labor Management Act which made it a crime for a person who
at that time was or had been in the previous five years a member
of the Communist Party to occupy executive positions in labor
unions. Chief Justice Warren found that the potential for con-
forming behavior to acceptable standards was irrelevant. 69 The
crucial factor for the Court was that the legislature usurped the
judicial function by finding that all Communists were danger-
ous. 70 The Court held that Congress may set forth rules of
general applicability, defining who is qualified to serve on a
union exectuive board, but it "cannot specify the people upon
whom the sanctions it prescribes are to be levied."'7' This task
belongs to the courts. 72 Thus, the crucial element in this analysis
is not whether a person is suffering a legislative sanction, but
whether that sanction was imposed after a legislative finding of
guilt.
D. The Solomon Amendment: Regulatory and Separation of
Powers Analysis
1. The regulatoiy analysis. Using the regulatory analysis, the
Court would view the Solomon Amendment as an attempt to
enforce the draft registration law. If prohibiting persons who fail
to file a compliance form is found to be a valid incident of this
regulation, the Act will stand. If, however, the Court finds that
Congress had a punitive motive in depriving non-registrants of
their governmental benefits, it will strike down the statute. 73
The Court might view the Solomon Amendment in its most
favorable light, as granting federal financial aid only to those
who affirm that they have registered by filing a compliance form.
Under this formulation, the Amendment does not reach the past
act of nonregistration and thus would not be considered
punishment.
74
381 U.S. 437 (1965).
69 381 U.S. at 458-59.
70 Id. at 450.
71 Id. at 461.
72 Id.
11 While this mode of analysis is similar to the analysis used in the separation of
powers mode, there is an important difference. Here, the Court considers whether the
legislature either was inflicting a punishment or was creating a deprivation incidental to
regulating. In the separation of powers mode, the Court only looks at whether the
legislature was acting like a court. Congress can legislate punishments for certain types
of conduct. Only the courts, however, may apply these punishments.
11 See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1877).
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The compliance form is not a means of ascertaining or pun-
ishing persons who failed to register. It merely encourages men
to register by denying them federal aid if they do not. The Court
might decide that persons who do not file the form are not
deemed by Congress to be guilty of breaking the Selective Ser-
vice law; these persons simply failed to file the form. They may
have done so for a number of reasons - because, for example,
they no longer need aid, or they plan to leave college.
The Court would look to the statute itself, and the Congres-
sional debates about its passage, to determine if the legislature
intended to enforce the Selective Service Act through the
Amendment. In the Senate, one of the sponsors of the legisla-
tion, Senator Hayakawa, stated that "[t]his Amendment seeks
not only to increase compliance with the registration require-
ment but also to insure the most fair and just usage of Federal
education benefits .... The Selective Service System was es-
tablished for a very important purpose. The success of this
system is crucial to the security of this country. ' '75 Senator Roger
W. Jepsen (R-Iowa) stated that "the chief purpose of the amend-
ment is to encourage greater compliance with the registration
requirement. Registration is the law of the land. And this amend-
ment is not meant to punish as many nonregistrants as
possible."
76
If the Court identifies the Amendment as having such a reg-
ulatory purpose, it next would determine whether Congress
implements this purpose in a way which imposes legitimate
burdens on noncomplying individuals or illegitimate burdens
meant to punish them. Under the Amendment, Congress dangles
the benefit of educational loans before the students, but requires
them to register if they want to receive the reward. The provi-
sion most likely will aid in the enforcement of registration. The
analysis, however, does not end here. The Court must consider
Justice Field's pronouncement in Cummings that "it by no
means follows that under the form of creating a qualification or
attaching a condition, the States can in effect inflict a punish-
ment for a past act . . . . 77
With this in mind, the Court would have to evaluate the
impact of the Amendment on the respective categories of men
affected by the action. The issue is whether they are suffering
a burden incidental to congressional regulation of the Selective
7- 128 CONG. REC. S4943-44 (daily ed. May 12,1982) (statement of Sen. Hayakawa).
76 Id. at S4945 (statement of Sen. Jepsen).
- 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1877).
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Service Act, or whether they are being intentionally punished
for their alleged past act of nonregistration. 78 The first category
to be considered consists of those men who have not yet turned
eighteen or who have turned eighteen less than thirty days
previously and can still register in compliance with the Selective
Service Act. These men can escape from the deprivations of
the bill, and thus, like the parties in Douds,79 Garner,80 and
Communist Party,8' are not being punished for past conduct.
The Court, however, would face considerable criticism if it
invoked the escapability proviso. Critics of the notion claim that
inescapability and the inevitability of punishment are not essen-
tial elements of a bill of attainder. Punishment in a bill of attain-
der can be preventive and is not limited to retribution. In Brown,
the Court held that inescapability is not a prerequisite of a bill
of attainder.8" Chief Justice Warren stated that punishment need
not be merely retributive, as it would be if the person could not
escape from the deprivation imposed by the statute. "Punish-
ment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deter-
rent - and preventive. '83 Warren explicitly noted that bills of
attainder were often passed to inflict deprivation "upon that
person or group in order to keep it from bringing about the
feared event. '84 Under the Court's reasoning, punishment within
the meaning of a bill of attainder does not necessarily have to
apply to the ineradicable past conduct of a person or group.
Congress can also be found to be punishing individuals when it
restricts them from engaging in certain behavior by legislating
specific disqualifications applicable to those presently engaging
in that behavior.
The Court also must examine the effect of the legislation on
the persons who can no longer register in compliance with the
law. The conduct of these persons with regard to registration is
ineradicable. They cannot escape the deprivations imposed by
the Solomon Amendment unless they turn themselves in or
perjure themselves by filing false forms. As the court in Doe
71 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614
(1960), characterized this distinction by stating that "[w]here the source of legislative
concern can be thought to be the activity or status from which the individual is barred,
the disqualification is not punishment even though it may bear harshly on the one
affected."
339 U.S. 382 (1950).
341 U.S. 716 (1951).
"367 U.S. 1 (1960).




pointed out, men who fail to register within thirty days of their
eighteenth birthday are subject to prosecution for late registra-
tion.85 Thus, Congress has isolated past conduct, specified the
group which has committed it, and punished the members of
this group for their ineradicable past conduct. This legislation
seems to fulfill all of the requirements of a bill of attainder.8 6
The government could not claim that the statute is a means of
enforcing the Selective Service Act as applied to this particular
group. The law does not encourage these people to register; it
is already too late for that. In this context, it merely attempts
to impose civil sanctions on persons who do not file compliance
forms. The legislation reaches the person, not the conduct, 87
and violates the prohibition against legislative punishment.
The Government may argue that because Congress has the
right to set reasonable terms for the benefits that it bestows on
the public, denying aid to those who refuse to comply with the
registration law cannot be considered punishment. 88 Further,
students do not have a right to education unless it is granted by
statute. The Higher Education Act does not guarantee an edu-
cation. 89 While the right of students in higher education to fi-
nancial aid might not rise to the level of a property right for the
purposes of due process protection, 90 its denial might be deemed
a punishment for the purposes of bill of attainder analysis. In
Cummings, the Court held that "[t]he deprivation of any rights,
civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the
circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation de-
termining this fact." 91
Thus, when Congress intends a deprivation, 92 and its intention
deprives a person of some benefit, its action may be deemed a
1 557 F. Supp. 937 (D. Minn. 1983). See 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1976).
'6 See supra text accompanying notes 26-46.
87 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960).
'8 See, e.g., id.
89 In Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court considered a challenge by grade
school students to their suspension on the basis that it was ordered without any pro-
cedural protections. The Court ruled that students had no right to an education outside
of that granted by state statute. Because the state did guarantee a public education, it
was required to provide procedural protections before it deprived students of that right.
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), however, Justice Rehnquist stated in a
plurality opinion that when the state chooses to create a benefit, it also may define the
procedural protections which accompany the benefit where the two are inextricably
intertwined.
90 Despite this argument, Department of Education regulations provide for protection
against loss of benefits. See supra text accompanying note 16.
91 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, at 320 (1866).
9 See, e.g., Nixon v. General Services Admin., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
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punishment. Denying a person education benefits clearly is a
deprivation. In Plyler v. Doe,93 Justice Brennan wrote for the
majority that ". . . education provides the basic tools by which
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the ben-
efit of us all." 94 Thus, Congress's denial of financial aid for
education seems to be the kind of deprivation that was deemed
a punishment in Cummings. Under the analysis of the regulatory
model, the Solomon Amendment is a bill of attainder.
2. The separation of powers analysis - legislative adjudica-
tion. If the Court uses a separation of powers analysis in eval-
uating the Solomon Amendment, as it did in Brown, its primary
concern will be determining whether Congress has adjudged
guilt and meted out punishment. If Congress has deemed per-
sons who have failed to file a compliance form guilty of regis-
tration evasion, the statute is a bill of attainder.95 Because the
Court must decide whether Congress has acted as a court or as
a legislative body, the notion of escapability and the distinction
between past and future nonregistrants is irrelevant here. The
sole question is whether Congress has adjudged people who fail
to file the compliance form guilty of nonregistration.
An examination of the congressional debates makes it clear
that supporters of the Amendment believed that persons who
did not comply with the form were in fact guilty of nonregistra-
tion. Many senators who supported the Amendment stated that
young men who did not register (that is, did not file a form
certifying that they had registered) should not receive govern-
mental benefits. 96 The House debates were similar. Represen-
tative Solomon's first words were: "Mr. Chairman, this amend-
ment prohibits young men who are in violation of the Draft
91457 U.S. 202 (1982).
9' 457 U.S. at 221.
9' 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
' The debates in the Senate on the Solomon Amendment show that supporters of the
Amendment believed that men who did not file the form would be guilty of non-
registration. Senator Mattingly, one of the Amendment's sponsors in the Senate, said,
"... as long as we have the law, all men reaching the age of 18 should and must register
for it. If a young man decides he will ignore this law, he should not be eligible for
financial assistance from the Federal Government." 128 CONG. REc. S4947 (daily ed.
May 12, 1982) (statement of Sen. Mattingly). Senator Hayakawa, another sponsor,
stated, "the responsibilities of registering with the Selective Service System should be
gladly accepted. If it [sic] is not, then America has every right to deny those who are
unwilling to do so financial assistance to advance their education." Id. at S4944 (state-
ment of Sen. Hayakawa). Senator Tower (R.-Tex.) expressed similar sentiments: "I do
not know why anyone should be permitted to claim the benefits of that which are
financed out of the pockets of the taxpayers of this country if they are not prepared
simply to register for a draft ...." Id. at S4945 (statement of Sen. Tower).
Draft Registration
Registration Act from receiving any financial assistance under
title IV of the Higher Education Act. ' 97 The Solomon Amend-
ment, however, is not a criminal statute that provides civil
penalties for draft evaders once a court has pronounced them
guilty. The Amendment instead uses the nonfiling of the regis-
tration compliance form to establish an irrebuttable presumption
that a person is guilty of violating the registration provisions of
the Selective Service Act. Representatives seemed to presume
that anyone who failed to file the compliance form was guilty.
For example, Representative Stratton (D-N.Y.) said that "[t]he
Amendment... is designed to prevent anybody who is violating
the registration law [from receiving educational aid]. '98
It is evident that Congress intended that those men who do
not file the compliance forms should be deemed not to have
registered and therefore should not share in the benefits of
federal financial aid. The separation of powers analysis prohibits
the legislative behavior involved here: adjudication of guilt fol-
lowed by punishment. Congress has determined who is guilty
of registration evasion. It does not matter that nonregistration
is punishable as a crime, and that Congress merely is adding to
the penalties for nonregistrants. What does matter is the means
through which Congress has chosen to enforce these penalties.
Congress could legislate that nonregistrants cannot receive fi-
nancial aid for education, but it must let the courts determine
whether a person has registered.
Thus, it is apparent from the existence of the compliance form
and the attitude of many of the supporters of the Amendment
that the Solomon Amendment is an act of legislative adjudica-
tion. The creation of such Congressional presumptions of guilt
clearly is prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs in Doe do not challenge Congress's power to add
civil sanctions, in the form of denial of federal financial aid, to
the criminal sanctions already imposed for failure to comply
with draft registration laws. They challenge the means Congress
has chosen to determine who will suffer deprivations: the re-
quirement students who desire aid must file a compliance form
9 128 Cong. Rec. H4757 (daily ed., July 28, 1982) (statement of Rep. Solomon).
Id. at H4759 (statement of Rep. Stratton).
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and the denial of aid to students who do not file forms. The
heart of plaintiffs' bill of attainder claim is that this process of
law enforcement, by which Congress determines the guilt of and
inflicts punishment on a specific group of persons without a
trial, is constitutionally forbidden.
The Supreme Court's decision in Doe should send a signal to
Congress about the limits of its power to legislate. If the Court
accepts the Solomon Amendment as a regulation, it must con-
strue the deprivation of aid as nonpunitive. This would require
a narrow definition of punishment and a holding that the Amend-
ment does not punish nonregistrants, but rewards registrants.
The Court, however, would be ignoring those men who cannot
register without facing prosecution. To this group, the statute
presents the option of losing aid or registering late and facing
prosecution.
If the Supreme Court accepts the Solomon Amemdment, it
will indicate that it will allow Congress a broad range of powers
to impose civil penalties on persons who fail to affirm their own
law-abiding behavior. If the Court rejects the Amendment as a
regulation, this power will be denied. Similarly, if the Court
rejects the Amendment from a separation of powers perspective,
it will signal Congress that it may punish persons for illegal
conduct only by passing laws applicable to the population at
large, leaving to the judiciary the task of applying them to
specific individuals.
